Fear and the Safety Net: Evidence from Secure Communities

Marcella Alsan
Harvard Kennedy School
NBER

Crystal Yang
Harvard Law School
NBER

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  - Majorities in developed countries now support deporting unauthorized immigrants (Gonzalez-Barrera and Connor 2019)
- Large-scale deportation generates fear and insecurity not just among immigrants but also co-ethnic citizens (Lopez et al. 2018)
- If fear of deportation is not limited to non-citizens, can immigration enforcement impede other government objectives?

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  - Non-take-up varies by ethnic groups and is higher among groups facing deportation risk, such as Hispanics in the United States (Morin, Taylor, and Patten 2012)
- In this study, we explore the connection between social and immigration policy by asking whether non-citizen expulsions influence co-ethnic citizen take-up of MTSI programs

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  - Watson (2014); Vargas and Pirog (2016); Cascio and Lewis (2019)
- To estimate ITE, leverage relatively new federal enforcement program known as Secure Communities (SC)

Anecdotal Evidence of ITE

Hispanics Forgo Health Services to Avoid Officials' Attention - Washington Post

"We're afraid of maybe getting sick or getting into an accident, but the fear of my husband being deported is bigger"

Anecdotal Evidence of ITE

Fear of Deportation Drives People Off Food Stamps in US - Associated Press

"They just make do on menial amounts of food. They're okay with rice and beans"

Other Evidence Consistent With ITE

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  - 37% of surveyed LA residents worried that they, a family member, or a friend would be deported
  - Among those who endorsed such a concern, 80% said that they, a friend, or family member would be at *greater risk* by enrolling in a government health, education, or housing program

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  - Among those who endorsed such a concern, 80% said that they, a friend, or family member would be at *greater risk* by enrolling in a government health, education, or housing program
- Handful of studies in public health literature that links status or specific raids to worse health, including for infants of U.S.-born Hispanic women (Korinek and Smith 2011; Novak et al. 2017)

Immigration Raids and Prenatal Health

Novak et al. 2017, IJE



Figure 1. Descriptive graph: rates of low birthweight (LBW) in the 37 weeks following the Postville raid compared with the same time period 1 and 2 years earlier.

Immigration Raids and Mental Health

Bruzelius and Baum 2019, AJPH

The Mental Health of Hispanic/Latino Americans Following National Immigration Policy Changes: United States, 2014–2018

Emilie Bruzelius MPH, and **Aaron Baum** PhD

[-] Author affiliations, information, and correspondence details

Emilie Bruzelius is with the Department of Epidemiology, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, New York, NY. Aaron Baum is with the Department of Health System Design and Global Health, Icahn School of Medicine, Mount Sinai, New York, NY.
Correspondence should be sent to Aaron Baum, PhD, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, 1216 5th Ave, New York, NY 10029 (e-mail: aaron.baum@mssm.edu). Reprints can be ordered at http://www.ajph.org by clicking the "Reprints" link.

Preview

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- Find reductions in SNAP and SSI take-up by Hispanic citizens of 2.1 and 1.6 ppt (10-30%)
- Responses unlikely driven by compositional changes, information changes, measurement error
- Suggestive evidence that findings are driven by fear

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Prior to Secure Communities

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- Prior to SC, non-citizens in violation of immigration laws identified by inmate interviews in local jails or prisons (CAP, 287(g) agreements)
  - Interviews were labor intensive, federal and local officials authorized to conduct interviews screened $< 15\%$ of local jails and prisons

Secure Communities

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- ICE compared fingerprints against Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) database that stores biometric and biographical information on:
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- If ICE had "probable cause," i.e. fingerprint matched an individual not supposed to be in the country due to overstay a visa or "entered without inspection" $\rightarrow$ issued detainer

Secure Communities

- Stated objectives of SC were to:
  - identify immigrants in U.S. custody who committed serious crimes and deport them
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  - prioritize enforcement actions to ensure removal of immigrants convicted of serious offenses
  - transform criminal immigration enforcement processes
- SC increased the probability immigrant arrestees who would otherwise have been released were subject to detention and removal

Detainers Under Secure Communities



Approx. 40 mil fingerprint submissions, 2 mil matches, and over 380,000 individuals forcibly removed from the interior. Removals under Obama admin's SC comprised 20% of the approx. 2 mil removals during the time period, highest in recent U.S. history

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- Re-activated by Trump in 2017 (Executive Order No. 13768)
- Response by some communities to disregard detainer order (i.e. sanctuary cities)

Outline

Safety Net Programs

- We focus on participation in SNAP and SSI - two of the fastest growing means-tested programs in the U.S.
  - SNAP participation increased from 20 to 40 million participants between 1990 and 2010 (CBO 2012). Reached $78 billion in spending in 2011, exceeding both EITC ($64 billion) and TANF ($29 billion)
  - SSI grew from 4.6 million beneficiaries in 1989 to 8.4 million in 2013 (Daly and Burkhauser 2003; Duggan et al. 2015). Benefits tripled over the same time period, from $14.6 billion to $44.4 billion

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- Both SNAP and SSI have fairly uniform eligibility requirements across states

SNAP Eligibility

- SNAP, previously known as the Food Stamp Program, is the largest near cash means-tested transfer program in the United States
- In general, households must have an annual income $\leq$ 130% of FPL and $\leq$ \$2,250 in assets
- Unauthorized immigrants are ineligible to receive benefits
  - However, if a household has at least one eligible person, then household can apply for benefits for the eligible person(s)
- The process typically involves filling out online or paper application followed by an interview ▸ SNAP Application

SSI Eligibility

- SSI is the largest cash welfare program in the United States
  - For nearly 60% of recipients, SSI is only source of income
- SSI provides benefits to blind or disabled children, blind or disabled working-age adults, and individuals 65 or older with no requirement of disability
  - In general, countable income must not exceed FBR and individual assets must not exceed $2,000 (or $3,000 for a couple)
- As with SNAP, unauthorized immigrants are ineligible for SSI

▸ SSI Application

Outline

Data from ICE and DHS

- Obtained through numerous FOIA requests
- Information on exact timing of SC roll-out in each county
- Micro-level data on universe of detainers and removals (date issued, crime level, country of origin, county detainer was issued, and demographics), county-level data on fingerprint submissions and matches
  - Approx. 2 million detainers issued between 2002-2015
  - Annual detainers ranges from 881 to 306,095
  - Mean age 32.2, 95% male, 93% Hispanic

Data from SNAP/SSI

Use two data sources to measure program take-up

- Restricted PSID (2005-2015) with county identifiers
  - Approximately 9,000 households (25,000 individuals) each wave
  - Demographics (age, race/ethnicity, # kids, poverty, employment)

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- For both ACS and PSID, focus on fragile "connected" household heads ($<$ HS degree, citizens/U.S. born)

Outline

Estimation Strategy: DiDiD

$$
\begin{aligned}
Y_{rcst} = \alpha &+ \beta_1 I_{ct}^{post} + \beta_2 (I_r^H \cdot I_{ct}^{post}) + \beta_3 (I_r^B \cdot I_{ct}^{post}) \\
&+ \Omega' X_{rcst} + \mu_c \cdot I_t^{memo} + \delta_{st} + \theta_{rs} + \kappa_{rt} \\
&+ \Gamma_1' X_{cst} + \Gamma_2' (X_{cst} \cdot I_r^B) + \Gamma_3' (X_{cst} \cdot I_r^H) + \epsilon_{rcst}
\end{aligned}
$$

Y_{rcst} = share of households that take up food stamps/SSI

I_{ct}^{post} = indicator for post-SC activation (2008-2013)

I_r^H and I_r^B= Hispanic and black race indicators

$\mu_c \cdot I_t^{memo}$ = county-memo FE, δ_{st} = state-year FE, θ_{rs} = race-state FE, κ_{rt} = race-year FE

X_{rcst} and X_{cst} include demographic and county-level controls such as poverty, children, share citizen, employment and crime rates.

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- β_2 is coefficient of interest

Secure Communities Activation



▸ First Stage on Detainers

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  - Use different sets of fixed effects
  - Predict activation dates using ICE criteria ▸ Predicted Rollout

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  - Use different sets of fixed effects
  - Predict activation dates using ICE criteria ▸ Predicted Rollout
- Main threat to identification: contemporaneous shocks timed with SC activation in a county that only affects Hispanics

DiDiD Balance

	F-Statistic (1)	p-value (2)
Outcome		
Log Poverty	2.141	0.073
# Children	0.932	0.444
Share Employed	1.104	0.399
Share Citizen	2.980	0.018
Share Food Stamp	1.715	0.144
Share SSI	2.415	0.047
Δ Log Poverty	0.668	0.615
Δ # Children	2.477	0.043
Δ Share Employed	1.599	0.172
Δ Share Citizen	2.326	0.055
Δ Share Food Stamp	1.505	0.198
Δ Share SSI	1.508	0.197

Note: Pre-SC regression of Hispanic-White difference on year-of-activation fixed effects.

Food Stamps - Event Studies



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

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

SSI - Event Studies



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

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

Food Stamps - Hispanics Relative to All Non-Hispanics

Hispanics



Non-Hispanics



▸ SSI - Hisp vs. Non-Hisp

Main Results

Outcome	*Share Food Stamp*
	(1)
Hispanic × Post	-0.021^{***}
	(0.008)
Post	0.005
	(0.004)
Black × Post	
Pre-Period Hisp. Mean	0.218
Fixed Effects	State-Yr, State-Race, Race-Yr, County-Morton
Baseline Controls	Yes
Observations	80,977
Number Clusters	2,759

Main Results

Outcome	*Share Food Stamp*	
	(1)	(2)
Hispanic × Post	-0.021^{***}	-0.022^{**}
	(0.008)	(0.009)
Post	0.005	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Black × Post		−0.003
		(0.009)
Pre-Period Hisp. Mean	0.218	0.218
Fixed Effects	State-Yr, State-Race, Race-Yr, County-Morton	
Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes
Observations	80,977	80,977
Number Clusters	2,759	2,759

Main Results

Outcome	*Share Food Stamp*		*Share SSI*
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Hispanic × Post	-0.021^{***}	-0.022^{**}	-0.016^{***}
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Post	0.005	0.005	0.006^{**}
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Black × Post		−0.003	
		(0.009)	
Pre-Period Hisp. Mean	0.218	0.218	0.053
Fixed Effects	State-Yr, State-Race, Race-Yr, County-Morton		
Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	80,977	80,977	80,977
Number Clusters	2,759	2,759	2,759

Main Results

Outcome	*Share Food Stamp*		*Share SSI*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Hispanic × Post	−0.021***	−0.022**	−0.016***	−0.017***
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Post	0.005	0.005	0.006**	0.007**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Black × Post		−0.003		−0.005
		(0.009)		(0.006)
Pre-Period Hisp. Mean	0.218	0.218	0.053	0.053
Fixed Effects	State-Yr, State-Race, Race-Yr, County-Morton			
Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	80,977	80,977	80,977	80,977
Number Clusters	2,759	2,759	2,759	2,759

Robustness Checks

- Results are robust to:
  1. County-year fixed effects
  2. Counties that activated 2009-2012
  3. Using predicted year
  4. Accounting for pre-SC activation trends in take-up
  5. Sample including HS grads
  6. Dropping cities with largest Hispanic populations
  7. Spatial lag in enforcement
  8. Female head only

▸ Robustness Event Study

Food Stamps - Robustness

	No GR	*County-Yr FE*	*Predicted Yr*	*Hisp/Nonhisp*	*Freyaldenhoven*	*< College*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Panel A: Share Food Stamp			
Hispanic × Post	−0.021***	−0.020**	−0.016*	−0.025***	−0.019**	−0.007*
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.004)
Post	0.005		−0.007*	0.010**	0.001	−0.001
	(0.004)		(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Fixed Effects			State-Yr, State-Race, Race-Yr, County-Morton			
Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	80,977	79,946	80,977	56,312	71,660	89,671

▸ SSI Robustness

Permutation Test – SNAP



Permutation Test – SSI



Outline

Mechanisms

- Information
- Compositional Changes
- Measurement Error
- Fear

Information

- Estimate results for prior users following Aizer and Currie (2004)
- Evidence not consistent with information (and unlikely to be stigma)

Outcome	*Share Food Stamp*		*Share SSI*	
Sample	*All*	*Prior User*	*All*	*Prior User*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Hispanic × Post	−0.138	−0.496***	−0.019	−1.129**
	(0.112)	(0.206)	(0.078)	(0.525)
Post	0.060	0.058	0.064	0.029
	(0.054)	(0.096)	(0.049)	(0.164)
Pre-Period Hisp. Mean	0.341	0.728	0.040	0.493
Fixed Effects	State-Yr, State-Race, Race-Yr, County-Morton			
Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	19,596	10,643	18,051	3,156
Number Clusters	628	369	610	178

Compositional/Employment Responses

- No evidence of changes in composition, employment, or migration

Outcome	*# Child*	*Log Pov*	*% Emp*	*% Moved*	*HH Weight*	*% Mixed*	*% Citizen*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Hispanic × Post	0.007	0.033	−0.002	0.003	−0.870		
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(2.896)		
Post	0.001	−0.017*	0.001	−0.001	−2.206	0.008	0.003*
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(2.192)	(0.008)	(0.002)
Pre-Period Hisp. Mean	0.713	3.766	0.377	0.054	107.620	0.176	0.687
Fixed Effects			State-Yr, State-Race, Race-Yr, County-Morton				
Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	80,977	80,977	80,977	80,977	80,977	25,342	25,342

Measurement Error

- Enforcement might change response to citizenship
  - No evidence of compositional changes in percent citizen
    ▸ Measurement of Naturalized
- Enforcement might change percent Hispanic
  - Results robust to controlling for percent Hispanic ▸ Additional Results I
- Enforcement might reduce willingness to report taking up SNAP
  - No change in the gap between administrative and survey based measures of SNAP take-up following SC activation ▸ Additional Results II

Fear - Correlation Between Fear and Detention



Fear - Google Deportation Searches

- To measure awareness/deportation fear, we use data from internet search patterns at DMA level
- Use commonly searched terms related to the *Deportation* topic:
  - *deportation, abogados de inmigracion, deportacion, immigration, inmigracion, immigration lawyer, indocumentado, undocumented*
- Normalize by search terms that are popular in the Hispanic community, such as *deportes* (sports) and *telenovelas* (soap operas) to account for differential access to internet

Fear - Google Deportation Searches



Fear

- We hypothesize that if fear driving results, effects should be **stronger** among:

Fear

- We hypothesize that if fear driving results, effects should be **stronger** among:
  - Locations where there are more low-level nonviolent detainers issued relative to violent detainers

Fear

- We hypothesize that if fear driving results, effects should be **stronger** among:
  - Locations where there are more low-level nonviolent detainers issued relative to violent detainers
  - Locations where deportation fear has increased more

Fear

- We hypothesize that if fear driving results, effects should be **stronger** among:
  - Locations where there are more low-level nonviolent detainers issued relative to violent detainers
  - Locations where deportation fear has increased more
- and **weaker** in sanctuary cities

Fear

- We hypothesize that if fear driving results, effects should be **stronger** among:
  - Locations where there are more low-level nonviolent detainers issued relative to violent detainers
  - Locations where deportation fear has increased more
- and **weaker** in sanctuary cities
- and **weaker** in areas with more Puerto Ricans and Cubans who have zero to minimal risk of deportation

Fear

Outcome	*Share Food Stamp*
	(1)
Hispanic × Post	0.007
	(0.015)
Hispanic × Post × Petty vs. Severe	−0.057**
	(0.025)
Hispanic × Post × Δ Pew Fear	
Hispanic × Post × Sanctuary City	
Hispanic × Post × % PR/Cuban	
Fixed Effects	State-Yr, State-Race, Race-Yr, County-Morton
Baseline Controls	Yes
Observations	65,903

Fear

Outcome	*Share Food Stamp*	
	(1)	(2)
Hispanic × Post	0.007	−0.043***
	(0.015)	(0.009)
Hispanic × Post × Petty vs. Severe	−0.057**	
	(0.025)	
Hispanic × Post × Δ Pew Fear		−0.213***
		(0.050)
Hispanic × Post × Sanctuary City		
Hispanic × Post × % PR/Cuban		
Fixed Effects	State-Yr, State-Race, Race-Yr, County-Morton	
Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes
Observations	65,903	76,800

Fear

Outcome	*Share Food Stamp*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Hispanic × Post	0.007	-0.043^{***}	-0.025^{***}
	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Hispanic × Post × Petty vs. Severe	-0.057^{**}		
	(0.025)		
Hispanic × Post × Δ Pew Fear		-0.213^{***}	
		(0.050)	
Hispanic × Post × Sanctuary City			0.036^{**}
			(0.010)
Hispanic × Post × % PR/Cuban			
Fixed Effects	State-Yr, State-Race, Race-Yr, County-Morton		
Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	65,903	76,800	86,407

Fear

Outcome	*Share Food Stamp*			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Hispanic × Post	0.007	−0.043***	−0.025***	−0.029***
	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Hispanic × Post × Petty vs. Severe	−0.057**			
	(0.025)			
Hispanic × Post × Δ Pew Fear		−0.213***		
		(0.050)		
Hispanic × Post × Sanctuary City			0.036**	
			(0.010)	
Hispanic × Post × % PR/Cuban				0.032**
				(0.013)
Fixed Effects	State-Yr, State-Race, Race-Yr, County-Morton			
Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	65,903	76,800	86,407	77,465

▸ SSI Mechanism

Fear - "Intensity" of Treatment



Fear - Sanctuary Cities Event Studies

Panel A: Hispanic

Sanctuary Cities



Non-Sanctuary Cities



Fear - Sanctuary Cities Event Studies

Panel B: Black

Sanctuary Cities



Non-Sanctuary Cities



Fear - Sanctuary Cities Event Studies

Panel C: White

Sanctuary Cities



Non-Sanctuary Cities



Outline

Stylized Model of Participation

- Extend Moffitt (1983) model to include spillover effects and deportation related costs of participation
- We incorporate *ITE* by allowing the utility of the citizen household head (the participation decision-maker) to depend on others in network
  - Cost of fear modeled as the subjective probability of deportation (π)
  - Deportation is costly if citizen decision-maker is connected to non-citizens (λ_n)

Stylized Model of Participation

Household decision-maker problem:

$$EU_{ijl} = \lambda_i \cdot (Y_j + p_{ijl} \mathbb{1}_{i \in C} \cdot (B_i)) + \lambda_c \cdot (Y_j + p_{ijl} B_{j,-i}) + \lambda_n \cdot (Y_j - \pi_{jl}(p_{ijl}))$$

- for head i of household j in location l, with C citizens and N non-citizens and T total members, with welfare weights $\lambda_i, \lambda_c, \lambda_n$
- Participation p_{ij} gives benefit B_j to citizens but increases deportation cost π_{jl} to non-citizens

Stylized Model of Participation

Household decision-maker problem:

$$EU_{ijl} = \lambda_i \cdot (Y_j + p_{ijl} \mathbb{1}_{i \in C} \cdot (B_i)) + \lambda_c \cdot (Y_j + p_{ijl} B_{j,-i}) + \lambda_n \cdot (Y_j - \pi_{jl}(p_{ijl}))$$

- for head i of household j in location l, with C citizens and N non-citizens and T total members, with welfare weights $\lambda_i, \lambda_c, \lambda_n$
- Participation p_{ij} gives benefit B_j to citizens but increases deportation cost π_{jl} to non-citizens
- Subjective change in deportation risk: $\Delta\pi_{jl} = \beta \cdot D_l + \varepsilon_{jl}$, where D_l is enforcement in location l and $\varepsilon \sim F()$

Model Predictions

- Share **not** participating in location l is given by:

$$s_l = 1 - F(\bar{\gamma}_l - \beta \cdot D_l)$$

  where $\bar{\gamma}_l = \frac{(\lambda_i + \lambda_c) \cdot (B_j)}{\lambda_n}$ averaged over location l
- **Non**-participation decreasing in benefit (B), decreasing in welfare weight on self (λ_i), increasing in connection to non-citizens (λ_n), increasing in enforcement (D)

Model Predictions

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$$s_l = 1 - F(\bar{\gamma}_l - \beta \cdot D_l)$$

  where $\bar{\gamma}_l = \frac{(\lambda_i + \lambda_c) \cdot (B_j)}{\lambda_n}$ averaged over location l
- **Non**-participation decreasing in benefit (B), decreasing in welfare weight on self (λ_i), increasing in connection to non-citizens (λ_n), increasing in enforcement (D)
- **In contrast**, s_l is increasing in λ_i when head is non-citizen: $\bar{\gamma}_l = \frac{(\lambda_c) \cdot (B_j)}{\lambda_i + \lambda_n}$ averaged over location l

Conclusion

- We find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that SC had a chilling spillover effect on participation in public welfare programs by Hispanic citizens
  - Back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that as a result of SC, Hispanic households forgo over $212 million and $77 million in food stamp and SSI benefits per year

Conclusion

- We find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that SC had a chilling spillover effect on participation in public welfare programs by Hispanic citizens
  - Back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that as a result of SC, Hispanic households forgo over $212 million and $77 million in food stamp and SSI benefits per year
- Hispanic households likely experienced worse contemporaneous health outcomes, as well as intergenerational declines in health and economic self-sufficiency (Tiehen et al. 2012, Hoynes et al. 2016)

Conclusion

- We find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that SC had a chilling spillover effect on participation in public welfare programs by Hispanic citizens
  - Back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that as a result of SC, Hispanic households forgo over $212 million and $77 million in food stamp and SSI benefits per year
- Hispanic households likely experienced worse contemporaneous health outcomes, as well as intergenerational declines in health and economic self-sufficiency (Tiehen et al. 2012, Hoynes et al. 2016)
- Increased non-violent immigrant removals and proposed public charge rule may induce responses

SNAP Application

▸ SNAP Eligibility

STATE OF CALIFORNIA - HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY — CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

6a. HOUSEHOLD'S INFORMATION

Complete the following information for all persons in the home that you buy and prepare food with, including you. **If applying for noncitizens, please complete question 6b and 6c. If not, go to question 6d.**

Social Security number is optional for members not applying for benefits. You must answer the questions below for each person applying for benefits.

APPLYING FOR BENEFITS (✔ check Yes or No)	NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	How is the person related to you?	DATE OF BIRTH	GENDER (M OR F)	U.S. CITIZEN or NATIONAL (✔ check Yes or No) If **no**, complete question 6b below	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
☐ Yes ☐ No		SELF			☐ Yes ☐ No	
☐ Yes ☐ No					☐ Yes ☐ No	
☐ Yes ☐ No					☐ Yes ☐ No	
☐ Yes ☐ No					☐ Yes ☐ No	
☐ Yes ☐ No					☐ Yes ☐ No	

Please list the names of anyone who lives with you that does not buy and prepare food with you:

NAME	NAME
NAME	NAME

6b. NONCITIZEN INFORMATION - Complete for those listed in question 6a above who are not citizens and are applying for aid.

Name	Date of Entry into U.S. (if known)	Give one of the following (if known): Passport Number, Alien Registration Number, etc.	Sponsored? (✔ check Yes or No) If **yes**, complete question 6c below:
		DOCUMENT TYPE: DOCUMENT NUMBER:	☐ Yes ☐ No
		DOCUMENT TYPE: DOCUMENT NUMBER:	☐ Yes ☐ No
		DOCUMENT TYPE: DOCUMENT NUMBER:	☐ Yes ☐ No

(PLEASE CHECK ONE)

Does anyone listed above have at least 10 years (40 quarters) of work history or military service in the USA? ☐ Yes ☐ No
If **yes**, who?_____

Does anyone listed above have, or have they applied for, or do they plan to apply for a T-Visa, U-Visa or VAWA status? ☐ Yes ☐ No
If **yes**, who?_____

6c. SPONSORED NONCITIZEN INFORMATION - Complete for those listed in question 6b above who are sponsored noncitizens and are applying for aid.
Did the sponsor sign an I-864? ☐ Yes ☐ No If **yes**, please answer the rest of the question. If the sponsor signed an I-134 then skip this question.

SSI Application

SSI Eligibility

24.	(b) Name of placing agency	Address	Telephone Number
			( ) -
	(c) Does this agency pay for your room and board? ☐ YES Go to #38 ☐ NO If NO, who pays?		Go to #38

HOUSEHOLD ARRANGEMENTS

25.	Check the block that describes your current residence, then Go to #26:		
	☐ House	☐ Mobile Home	
	☐ Apartment	☐ Houseboat	
	☐ Room (private home)	☐ Other (Specify)	
	☐ Room (commercial establishment)		
26.	Do you live alone or only with your spouse?	☐ YES Go to #28	☐ NO Go to #27

27. (a) Give the following information about everyone who lives with you:

Name	Relationship	Public Assistance		Sex		Birthdate mm/dd/yy	Blind or Disabled		If Under 22				Social Security Number
									Married		Student		
		YES	NO	M	F		YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	

GAO ACA


www.healthcare.gov
Still need health coverage?
Enterprise Identity Management System
Federally Facilitated Marketplace System
Eligibility & enrollment
Provide services to make eligibility determinations, plan selections, and complete enrollment
Plan management
Business processes for managing qualified health plans and issuers
Financial management
Facilitates payments to issuers, including premiums and cost-sharing reductions, and collects data from state-based marketplaces
Other functions
Federal Data Services Hub
Eligibility Verification
Coverage
DHS
SSA
Insurance affordability programs
IRS
Equifax Incorporated
Determination of alternate healthcare coverage
DOD
Peace Corps
OPM
VA
State-based enrollment related functions
State Medicaid and Children's Health Insurance Program
Health Insurance Oversight System

"First Stage" Effect of SC on Detainers

▸ SC Activation



Predicted Rollout

▸ DID



SSI - Hispanic and Non-Hispanic Event Studies

Hispanic



Non-Hispanic



▸ Hispanics Relative to Non-Hisp

Hispanics Event Study - County*Yr FE

▸ Robustness

Panel A. Share Food Stamp

Non-Hispanic Blacks



Hispanics



Panel B. Share SSI

Non-Hispanic Blacks



Hispanics



SSI - Robustness

	No GR (1)	*County-Yr FE* (2)	*Predicted Yr* (3)	*Hisp/Nonhisp* (4)	*Freyaldenhoven* (5)	*< College* (6)
			Panel B: Share SSI			
Hispanic × Post	−0.016***	−0.017**	−0.015**	−0.018***	−0.017**	−0.003
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.002)
Post	0.006**		0.004	0.008***	0.003	0.0001
	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Fixed Effects			State-Yr, State-Race, Race-Yr, County-Morton			
Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	80,977	79,946	80,977	56,312	71,660	89,671

▸ Food stamps robustness

Mechanism - SSI

Outcome	*Share SSI*			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Hispanic × Post	−0.003	−0.025***	−0.015***	−0.023***
	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Hispanic × Post × Proportion Petty	−0.026			
	(0.016)			
Hispanic × Post × Δ Pew Fear		−0.101***		
		(0.030)		
Hispanic × Post × Sanctuary City			−0.006	
			(0.007)	
Hispanic × Post × % PR/Cuban				0.041***
				(0.008)
Fixed Effects	State-Yr, State-Race, Race-Yr, County-Morton			
Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	65,903	76,800	86,407	77,465

▸ FS Mechanism

Measurement of Naturalized



▸ Measurement Error

Additional Results I

	No Weights Hisp > 25%	*Individual*	*Hisp Share*	*Non-Citizens*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		Panel A: Share Food Stamp		
Hispanic × Post	−0.015	−0.027***	−0.023***	−0.021***
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Post	0.012*	0.006	0.005	0.005
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
		Panel B: Share SSI		
Hispanic × Post	−0.006	−0.016***	−0.017***	−0.016***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Post	0.007*	0.006**	0.007**	0.006**
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Fixed Effects	State-Yr, State-Race, Race-Yr, County-Morton			
Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	61,997	80,327	80,977	80,977

▸ Measurement Error

Additional Results II

Comparison of ACS Food Stamp Estimates to Administrative State Data

	Hispanics	*Whites*	*Blacks*	*Hispanics vs. Whites*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Post	−58600.667	−11203.418	−4676.916	−14374.708
	(70348.757)	(28268.512)	(8868.256)	(9897.761)
Fixed Effects		State, Year		
Observations	23	31	31	31

▸ Measurement Error