# Does Diversity Matter for Health? Experimental Evidence from Oakland 

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## Assess a Recommendation from Leading Medical Institutes

## Increase Diversity of Physician Workforce

## Recommendation 1: Increase the Racial and Ethnic Diversity of the U.S. Physician Workforce

The AMA works to increase the number of minority physicians to reflect the diversity of the U.S. population through its policies and advocacy work.

The healthcare workforce and its ability to deliver quality care for racial and ethnic minorities can be improved substantially by increasing the proportion of underrepresented U.S. racial and ethnic minorities among health professionals.

## This Study

- Tests whether African-American men increase their take-up of preventive care when randomly assigned to an African-American male doctor.

1. AAM lowest life expectancy of major demographic groups in the US.
2. Many deaths are preventable.
3. Preventive care take-up is relatively low.
4. Medical mistrust is relatively high.

## Overview of Study Design

Two-stage 'double-blind' randomized design at the individual level

- Stage One: Pre-Consultation
- Subject introduced to randomly assigned doctor via photo on tablet.
- Subject selects preventive services via tablet.
- Random subset of subjects also receive flu vaccination incentive.
- Stage Two: Post-Consultation
- Subject interacts with doctor in person.
- Subject revises service selection.
- Subject receives services chosen from assigned doctor.


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- Subject interacts with doctor in person.
- Subject revises service selection.
- Subject receives services chosen from assigned doctor.
- Hypotheses Tested
- Aversion to MD different race $\rightarrow$ Learning MD black via tablet $\uparrow$ demand (Pre).
- Better within-race pair interaction $\rightarrow$ Meeting with black MD $\uparrow$ demand (Post).


## Recruitment

- Black men recruited from ~20 barbershops and two flea markets around the East Bay.
- Individuals who completed baseline survey (regarding health and demographics) received voucher for free haircut.
- Given a coupon for free health screening.
- Uber donated ride-sharing services.



## Redeem Coupon at Clinic

- To facilitate our experiment, set up a clinic.
- Hired 14 doctors and about 25 field/clinic staff.
- Oakland Men's Health Disparities Project (Double blind).
- Doctors role: encourage all patients to obtain all services, provide services.
- Worked on "off" Saturdays.



## Randomization

- Subjects entered clinic if had valid coupon.
- Escorted to private patient room.
- Given incentive payment for showing up.
- Received tablet which did in-form randomization (SurveyCTO) to doctor.



## Pre-Consultation Stage - Tablet Screenshots

Panel A


Panel B


Below is a list of services available to you today. All services are optional.


Select all services you wish to receive:
$\square$ Blood pressure measurement
$\square$ Weight and height measurement
$\square$ Cholesterol screening (requires finger prick)
$\square$ Diabetes screening (requires finger prick)
$\square$ None of the above

## Post-Consultation Stage

- Post-Consultation - patient interacts with doctor in person.
- Revises choices.
- Receives chosen services.
- Fill out feedback form privately.
- Escorted out of clinic.



SUBJECT FEEDBACK

No imbalance across arms or differential attrition.

## Pre-Consultation Preventives - Non-Black Doctors



Blood Pressure (56\%)


Diabetes (37\%)



## Pre-Consultation Preventives - Black Doctors



Blood Pressure (58\%)


Diabetes (43\%)



## Effects on Pre-Consultation Preventives

|  | Blood <br> Pressure | BMI | Diabetes | Cholesterol | Flu <br> Vaccination |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Black Doctor | 0.025 | 0.023 | 0.050 | 0.010 | -0.009 |
|  | $(0.039)$ | $(0.040)$ | $(0.039)$ | $(0.038)$ | $(0.037)$ |
|  | $\{0.045\}$ | $\{0.043\}$ | $\{0.048\}$ | $\{0.052\}$ | $\{0.039\}$ |
| RI p-value | 0.635 | 0.645 | 0.431 | 0.875 | 0.850 |
| Control Mean | 0.56 | 0.50 | 0.37 | 0.35 | 0.20 |
| Observations | 637 | 637 | 637 | 637 | 637 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the doctor level in curly brackets. RI p-values in row below.

## Post-Consultation Preventives - Non-Black Doctors

Non-Black MD


Diabetes $(37 \% \rightarrow 42 \%)$



Cholesterol (35\% $\rightarrow 36 \%$ )

## Post-Consultation Preventives - Black Doctors




Diabetes ( $43 \% \rightarrow 63 \%$ )



Cholesterol ( $35 \% \rightarrow 62 \%$ )

## Effects on Post-Consultation Preventives

|  | Blood <br> Pressure | BMI | Diabetes | Cholesterol | Flu <br> Vaccination |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Black Doctor | 0.107 | 0.161 | $0.204^{* *}$ | $0.256^{* *}$ | $0.100^{* *}$ |
|  | $(0.033)$ | $(0.036)$ | $(0.039)$ | $(0.038)$ | $(0.038)$ |
|  | $\{0.074\}$ | $\{0.099\}$ | $\{0.062\}$ | $\{0.071\}$ | $\{0.037\}$ |
| RI p-value | 0.251 | 0.220 | 0.039 | 0.023 | 0.047 |
| Control Mean | 0.72 | 0.60 | 0.42 | 0.36 | 0.18 |
| Observations | 637 | 637 | 637 | 637 | 637 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the doctor level in curly brackets. Stars based off of RI p-values.

## Mechanisms

1. Communication.
2. Quality.
3. Effort.
4. Discrimination.

## Communication

- Respondents 10 ppt more likely to talk to black physicians than white physicians.
- Black doctors' notes were 11 char. longer notes than non-black doctors.
- Results accord with non-experimental studies:
- Qualtrics survey we devised: black and white respondents demonstrated preference for homophily when asked who they felt most comfortable "sharing their concerns with" and who "understood them best". Communication and Concordance
- MEPS data: MD-patient concordance associated with 8 ppt increase in "understand my doctor" and agreeing "doctor listens to me". ©MEPS


## Quality - Doctor Similar on Characteristics/Assessments

|  | PANEL A: Doctor Characteristics |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Medical School Rank: <br> Research | Medical School Rank: <br> Primary Care | Internist | Experience |
| Black Mean | 24.00 | 23.00 | 0.67 | 15.17 |
| Non-Black Mean | 11.00 | 16.00 | 1.00 | 12.25 |
| $p$-value | .846 | .559 | .089 | .741 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Persuade Black Men | Persuade White Men | Most Comply | Board Question |
| Black Mean | 0.50 | 0.33 | 0.50 | Performance |
| Non-Black Mean | 0.75 | 0.75 | 1.00 | 0.78 |
| $p$-value | 0.30 | 0.13 | 0.03 | 0.83 |
| Observations | 14 | 14 | 14 | 0.66 |

All doctors were vetted for malpractice suits by Stanford.

## Discrimination - Ratings within and outside of Experiment very Similar

- Patients within study did not rate or recommend black doctors more than non-black doctors.
- $99 \%$ recommend doctor and rate 4.8 out of 5 .
- Patients oustide study also did not rate doctors differently.
- Vitals.com ratings: black doctor average $=4.35$; non-black average $=4.56$
- No difference in error rates on devices.


## Patient Comments



## Summary of Evidence on Mechanisms

## 1. Communication

- More likely to talk with doctors about other health and personal matters.
- Concordance strongest for healthcare-related communication questions.
- Black MD effect greater for those with $\uparrow$ mistrust who might be skeptical of information.

2. Quality

- Rank of medical school: Black doctors' schools ranked lower.
- Experience: Black MD slightly more est. years, but less likely to be internists.
- Similar board scores and experience with black male patients.
- Error rates and malpractice suits: Low/none for both sets of doctors.
- Performance on subjects not meeting study criteria: Lower for black doctors.
- Doctor fixed effects: Race most important.


## 3. Effort

- Time with patient: similar across treatments after controlling for additional testing.
- Targeting: no evidence of targeting by disease presence/severity.

4. Discrimination

- No differences in preventive selections pre consultation.
- Very high ratings for both sets of doctors post consultation.
- Distribution of patient test results similar across MD race (no withholding).


## Conclusion

- Black men randomized to black male doctors increase their uptake of preventive care.
- Results seem to be driven by better communication during the patient-doctor interaction (though more evidence needed).
- Findings suggest policies that increase the supply of African-American doctors could help narrow racial health gaps.
- Thank you!


## Gap Largely Explained by Cancer and CVD

Miscellaneous Diseases


## TSUS Event Study

## Alsan and Wanamaker (QJE 2017)

Tuskegee Disclosure and Health Care Utilization
Outpatient visits, black men relative to white men
Percentage point change in outpatient visits, dependent on proximity to Tuskegee, Alabama
3


## Utilization in MEPS

Adult Male Sample

|  | $(1)$ | $(2)$ | $(3)$ | $(4)$ | $(5)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Go To Doctor for Preventive Care |  |  |  |  |
| Black Respondent | $-0.008^{* * *}$ | $-0.007^{* * *}$ | $-0.005^{* * *}$ | $-0.005^{* *}$ | $-0.005^{* *}$ |
|  | $(0.002)$ | $(0.002)$ | $(0.002)$ | $(0.002)$ | $(0.002)$ |
| Asian Respondent | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.003 |
|  | $(0.003)$ | $(0.003)$ | $(0.003)$ | $(0.003)$ | $(0.003)$ |
| Hispanic Respondent | -0.000 | 0.001 | $0.004^{*}$ | $0.004^{* *}$ | $0.004^{* *}$ |
|  | $(0.002)$ | $(0.002)$ | $(0.002)$ | $(0.002)$ | $(0.002)$ |
| Age Categories | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Insurance | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Income Categories | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Education Categories | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| Observations | 76280 | 76280 | 76280 | 76280 | 76280 |

## Race/Ethnicity of Patients and Doctors in MEPS

|  | White MD | Black MD | Hispanic MD | Asian MD |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| White Patient | 0.851 | 0.017 | 0.039 | 0.093 |
| Black Patient | 0.527 | 0.257 | 0.065 | 0.151 |
| Hispanic Patient | 0.381 | 0.029 | 0.439 | 0.151 |
| Asian Patient | 0.254 | 0.009 | 0.027 | 0.710 |

Concordance

- African-Americans make up $12 \%$ of population but are only $3.5 \%$ of physician workforce.
- $73 \%$ ( $42 \%$ ) of black doctors seen by black men (women) are male (female).
- Sample includes individuals $18+$. Other race is omitted.

Sex of Patients and Doctors in MEPS

| ت |  | Doctor |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Female | Male |
|  | Female | 0.34 | 0.66 |
|  | Male | 0.17 | 0.83 |

## Coupon

Coupon for Free Men's Health Screening

- See a doctor about a free health screening
and receive $\$ 50$
Receive free health screening for:

1. Diabetes
2. Cholesterol
3. Height and Weight (Body Mass Index)
4. Blood Pressure
Subject ID_ Map on back)
Slinic Hours:
11am-5pm

## Beliefs

- "Flu shot makes me sick."
- "Fear of being experimented on."
- Diagnosed with diabetes in the past but, "refused to believe it."
- Nutritional or other remedies can ward off illness - no need for screening. $\checkmark$ Framework and Hypotheses Tested


## Pre-Consultation Stage - Cases

- Case I: $d>0$ if $r_{j=w}$ and $d=0$ otherwise
- Fraction of subjects that demand preventives will be strictly greater for those randomized to black versus white doctors.
- $\operatorname{Pr}\left(\left.\beta_{i}>\frac{c+d_{r_{j=w}}}{b} \right\rvert\, r_{j=w}\right)=1-\frac{\left(c+d_{r_{j=w}}\right)}{b}<1-\frac{c}{b}=\operatorname{Pr}\left(\left.\beta_{i}>\frac{c}{b} \right\rvert\, r_{j=b}\right)$
- Case II: $d>0$ if $r_{j=b}$ and $d=0$ otherwise
- Black men discriminate against doctors of their own race.
- $\operatorname{Pr}\left(\left.\beta_{i}>\frac{c}{b} \right\rvert\, r_{j=w}\right)>\operatorname{Pr}\left(\left.\beta_{i}>\frac{c+d_{r_{j=b}}}{b} \right\rvert\, r_{j=b}\right)$.
- Case III: $d=0 \forall r_{j}$ or $d>0 \forall r_{j}$
- No aversion to doctors based on their race, or the same level of aversion to doctors regardless of their race.
- $\operatorname{Pr}\left(\left.\beta_{i}>\frac{c+d}{b} \right\rvert\, r_{j=w}\right)=\operatorname{Pr}\left(\left.\beta_{i}>\frac{c+d}{b} \right\rvert\, r_{j=b}\right)$.
- $\operatorname{Pr}\left(\left.\beta_{i}>\frac{c}{b} \right\rvert\, r_{j=w}\right)=\operatorname{Pr}\left(\left.\beta_{i}>\frac{c}{b} \right\rvert\, r_{j=b}\right)$.


## Post-Consultation Stage - Cases

- Case I: $\mathbb{1}=\left\{\begin{array}{ll}1 & \text { if } \Delta r_{j i}=1 \\ 0 & \text { if } \Delta r_{j i}=0\end{array}\right.$ and $\delta \in(0,1)$
- If patients self-identify as black, then minimizing social distance by pairing such patients with black doctors dominates pairings with white doctors.
- $\mathbb{E}\left[U^{1} \mid r_{j=w}\right]=b-c-\frac{\delta b}{2}<b-c=\mathbb{E}\left[U^{1} \mid r_{j=b}\right]$.
- Case II: $\mathbb{1}=\left\{\begin{array}{ll}0 & \text { if } \Delta r_{j i}=1 \\ 1 & \text { if } \Delta r_{j i}=0\end{array}\right.$ and $\delta \in(0,1)$
- White doctors are viewed as more credible sources of information than black doctors.
- $\mathbb{E}\left[U^{1} \mid r_{j=w}\right]>\mathbb{E}\left[U^{1} \mid r_{j=b}\right]$.
- Case III: $\delta=0$ or $\delta=1$ for all $r_{j}$
- Either no discounting of information by social distance or the information is discounted fully from both black or white doctors.


## Empirical Framework

$$
\begin{equation*}
Y_{i}=\alpha+\beta_{1} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{i}^{\text {BlackMD }}+\beta_{2} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{i}^{\$ 5}+\beta_{3} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{i}^{\$ 10}+\Gamma^{\prime} X_{i}+\epsilon_{i} \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where:

- $i$ represents an individual subject
- $Y_{i}$ is the selection of preventive services
- $\mathbb{1}_{i}^{\text {BlackMD }}$ is an indicator for black MD
- $\mathbb{1}_{i}^{\$ 5}$ is an indicator for a $\$ 5$ incentive for the flu vaccination
- $\mathbb{1}_{i}^{\$ 10}$ is an indicator for a $\$ 10$ incentive for the flu vaccination
- $X_{i}$ are subject characteristics (included in some specifications)
- $\beta_{1}$ is the ITT/TOT (given perfect compliance).
- multiple forms of inference

Identification: $E\left(\epsilon_{i} \mid \mathbb{1}_{i}^{T}\right)=0$

## Effects on Pre-Consultation Preventives with Incentives

|  | Blood <br> Pressure | BMI | Diabetes | Cholesterol | Flu <br> Vaccination |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Black Doctor | 0.025 | 0.023 | 0.050 | 0.010 | -0.009 |
|  | $(0.039)$ | $(0.040)$ | $(0.039)$ | $(0.038)$ | $(0.037)$ |
| Incentive | 0.028 | -0.059 | $0.085^{*}$ | 0.067 | $0.192^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.048)$ | $(0.049)$ | $(0.048)$ | $(0.047)$ | $(0.043)$ |
| \$10 Incentive | -0.023 | -0.009 | 0.028 | -0.014 | $0.299^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.048)$ | $(0.048)$ | $(0.047)$ | $(0.045)$ | $(0.043)$ |
| Control Mean | 0.56 | 0.50 | 0.37 | 0.35 | 0.20 |
| Observations | 637 | 637 | 637 | 637 | 637 |

## Inference: Exact Test, Delta Share



## Other Modes of Inference



## Balance Table

|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Mean } \\ & \text { (S.D.) } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Non-Black } \\ \text { MD- } \$ 5 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Non-Black } \\ & \text { MD - } \$ 10 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Black } \\ \text { MD - } \$ 0 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Black } \\ \text { MD - } \$ 5 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Black } \\ M D-\$ 10 \end{gathered}$ | $F$-test | $p$-value | $N$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Self-Reported Health | $\begin{gathered} 0.72 \\ (0.45) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.033 \\ (0.066) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.181^{* * *} \\ (0.067) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.007 \\ (0.065) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.016 \\ (0.064) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.004 \\ (0.063) \end{gathered}$ | 2.075 | 0.067 | 563 |
| Any Health Problem | $\begin{gathered} 0.62 \\ (0.49) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.026 \\ (0.068) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.036 \\ (0.065) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.015 \\ & (0.069) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.025 \\ (0.067) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.021 \\ (0.066) \end{gathered}$ | 0.250 | 0.940 | 614 |
| ER Visits | $\begin{gathered} 1.69 \\ (3.54) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.149 \\ (0.434) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.867 \\ (0.609) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.212 \\ (0.443) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.145 \\ (0.558) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.391 \\ (0.419) \end{gathered}$ | 1.336 | 0.247 | 511 |
| Nights Hospital | $\begin{gathered} 1.20 \\ (3.52) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.392 \\ (0.415) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.839 \\ (0.734) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.956 \\ (1.490) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.214 \\ (0.466) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.230 \\ (0.663) \end{gathered}$ | 1.332 | 0.249 | 511 |
| Has Primary MD | $\begin{gathered} 0.63 \\ (0.49) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.042 \\ (0.074) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.033 \\ (0.070) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.059 \\ (0.073) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.008 \\ (0.070) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.019 \\ (0.071) \end{gathered}$ | 0.415 | 0.838 | 537 |
| Medical Mistrust | $\begin{gathered} 1.61 \\ (0.74) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.162 \\ (0.105) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.046 \\ (0.100) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.032 \\ (0.105) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.016 \\ (0.105) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.034 \\ (0.100) \end{gathered}$ | 0.979 | 0.430 | 611 |
| Age | $\begin{gathered} 44.96 \\ (14.76) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.051 \\ & (1.973) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.100 \\ & (2.001) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.261 \\ (1.982) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.109 \\ & (2.048) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.495 \\ & (1.944) \end{aligned}$ | 0.109 | 0.990 | 620 |
| Married | $\begin{gathered} 0.14 \\ (0.35) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.043 \\ (0.052) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.037 \\ (0.045) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.069 \\ (0.055) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.015 \\ & (0.047) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.024 \\ (0.050) \end{gathered}$ | 1.120 | 0.348 | 586 |
| Unemployed | $\begin{gathered} 0.32 \\ (0.47) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.045 \\ (0.066) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.008 \\ (0.066) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.051 \\ & (0.065) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.008 \\ (0.065) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.025 \\ (0.065) \end{gathered}$ | 0.394 | 0.853 | 570 |
| High School Education | $\begin{gathered} 0.62 \\ (0.49) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.006 \\ (0.070) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.006 \\ (0.070) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.029 \\ (0.072) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.055 \\ (0.068) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.034 \\ (0.068) \end{gathered}$ | 0.344 | 0.886 | 556 |
| Low Income | $\begin{gathered} 0.47 \\ (0.50) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.026 \\ (0.072) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.033 \\ (0.071) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.043 \\ (0.072) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.022 \\ (0.070) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.042 \\ (0.069) \end{gathered}$ | 0.258 | 0.936 | 571 |
| Uninsured | $\begin{gathered} 0.22 \\ (0.42) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.042 \\ (0.066) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.146^{* *} \\ (0.067) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.112 \\ (0.070) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.057 \\ (0.064) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.010 \\ (0.062) \end{gathered}$ | 1.398 | 0.223 | 517 |
| Attrition | $\begin{gathered} 0.03 \\ (0.18) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.022 \\ (0.033) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.045 \\ (0.034) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.031 \\ (0.034) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.015 \\ (0.031) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.029 \\ (0.025) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | 1.715 | 0.129 | 684 |

## Communication - Table 8

## Experimental Evidence



Standard errors clustered at the doctor level in curly brackets.

```
- Communication
```


## Further Evidence on Concordance from a Large Scale Survey

- To complement experimental results, we conducted a survey to understand concordance in the general population.
- 1,490 self-identify black and white male respondents.
- Respondents matched educational characteristics of study sample (i.e. $50 \%$ had high school education or less).
- Questions regarding World Health Organization (2003) domains of a responsive health system - quality, access and communication.
- Asked respondents which doctor was most likely to meet certain characteristics.


## Quality and Concordance

## Responses near 50\%



## Communication and Concordance

## Responses shift right



Black Respondent White Respondent

## Concordance in MEPS

## Adult Male Sample

|  | Go To Doctor for <br> Preventive Care | Doctor Listens | Understand Doctor |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Black Respondent | $-0.008^{*}$ | -0.013 | -0.015 |
| Black MD | $(0.005)$ | $(0.012)$ | $(0.014)$ |
|  | -0.012 | $-0.064^{* *}$ | $-0.066^{*}$ |
| Black Resp * Black MD | $(0.009)$ | $(0.025)$ | $(0.040)$ |
|  | $0.020^{* *}$ | $0.082^{* * *}$ | $0.080^{*}$ |
| Any Insurance | $(0.009)$ | $(0.026)$ | $(0.041)$ |
|  | 0.004 | $0.051^{* * *}$ | 0.022 |
| Age Categories | $(0.003)$ | $(0.010)$ | $(0.013)$ |
| Income Categories | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Education Categories | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Other Ethnic/Race Groups | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 32,189 | Yes | Yes |
| Years | $2005-2015$ | $2005-2015$ | 7,649 |

## Heterogeneous Effects

Interaction among those who lack health care experience or are mistrustful of medical field

| $X=$ | No Recent Screening | ER Visits | Medical <br> Mistrust |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Black Doctor * $X$ | 0.215* | 0.015 | 0.078 |
|  | (0.080) | (0.011) | (0.068) |
|  | \{0.053\} | \{0.008\} | \{0.055\} |
| X | -0.065 | -0.001 | -0.050 |
|  | (0.052) | (0.002) | (0.036) |
|  | \{0.045\} | \{0.003\} | \{0.033\} |
| Black Doctor | 0.153 | 0.159 | 0.177 |
|  | (0.028) | (0.033) | (0.029) |
|  | \{0.052 \} | \{0.058\} | \{0.056\} |
| $\operatorname{Prob}\left(\left\|\beta^{\text {RI: Black Dr*X }}\right\|>\left\|\beta^{\text {Study Est. }}\right\|\right)$ | 0.057 | 0.182 | 0.313 |
| Observations | 604 | 511 | 611 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the doctor level in curly brackets. Stars based off of RI p-values shown for interaction term.

## Persuasion Rate



- $f=100 \cdot \frac{y_{T}-y_{c}}{e_{T}-e_{C}} \cdot \frac{1}{1-y_{0}}$ (DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010).


## Persuasion Rate Comparison



## Flu Vaccination - Ex Post, by MD Race



## Difference-in-Differences, Non-Criteria Subjects

- Delta invasive coefficient on black subject * black MD $=.267$



## Alternative Fixed Effects

Main coefficients: $\beta_{1}^{\text {pre }}=0.027, \beta_{1}^{\text {post }}=0.182, \beta_{1}^{\text {delta }}=0.155$

|  | Ex Ante | Ex Post | Delta | Ex Ante | Ex Post | Delta | Ex Ante | Ex Post | Delta |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Reception Officer |  |  | Study Date |  |  | Recruitment Location |  |  |
| Black Doctor | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.036 \\ (0.031) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.191^{* * *} \\ (0.029) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.154^{* * *} \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.032 \\ (0.030) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.178^{* * *} \\ (0.029) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.146^{* * *} \\ (0.022) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.035 \\ (0.030) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.184^{* * *} \\ (0.029) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.149^{* * *} \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ |
| \$5 Incentive | $\begin{gathered} 0.027 \\ (0.037) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.062^{*} \\ & (0.035) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.034 \\ (0.027) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.032 \\ (0.036) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.049 \\ (0.035) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.017 \\ (0.027) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.026 \\ (0.037) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.047 \\ (0.036) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.022 \\ (0.027) \end{gathered}$ |
| \$10 Incentive | $\begin{gathered} -0.007 \\ (0.036) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.011 \\ (0.034) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.018 \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.005 \\ & (0.036) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.004 \\ (0.034) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.001 \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.011 \\ (0.036) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.007 \\ & (0.035) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.004 \\ (0.026) \end{gathered}$ |
| Control Mear Observations | 0.44 637 | $\begin{array}{r} 0.53 \\ 637 \end{array}$ | 0.08 637 | 0.44 637 | 0.53 637 | 0.08 637 | 0.44 618 | 0.53 618 | 0.08 618 |

## Alternative Samples

Main coefficients: $\beta_{1}^{\text {pre }}=0.027, \beta_{1}^{\text {post }}=0.182, \beta_{1}^{\text {delta }}=0.155$

|  | Ex Ante | Ex Post | Delta | Ex Ante | Ex Post | Delta | Ex Ante | Ex Post | Delta |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | All Subjects |  |  | Without Assisted Subjects |  |  | Strict Specification |  |  |
| Black Doctor | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.023 \\ (0.030) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.176^{* * *} \\ (0.028) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.153 * * * \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.016 \\ (0.031) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.177 * * * \\ (0.029) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.161 * * * \\ (0.023) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.031 \\ (0.032) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.179^{* * *} \\ (0.030) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.148 * * * \\ (0.023) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| \$5 Incentive | $\begin{gathered} 0.038 \\ (0.037) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.066^{*} \\ & (0.035) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.028 \\ (0.028) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.027 \\ (0.038) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.064 * \\ & (0.036) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.038 \\ (0.028) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.033 \\ (0.039) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.070 * \\ & (0.037) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.037 \\ (0.028) \end{gathered}$ |
| \$10 Incentive | $\begin{aligned} & -0.002 \\ & (0.036) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.006 \\ (0.034) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.008 \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.009 \\ (0.037) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.005 \\ (0.035) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.014 \\ (0.026) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.023 \\ & (0.038) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.005 \\ & (0.037) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.018 \\ (0.026) \end{gathered}$ |
| Control Mear Observations | $\begin{gathered} 0.44 \\ 651 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.53 \\ 651 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.08 \\ 651 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.45 \\ 623 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.53 \\ 623 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.08 \\ 623 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.45 \\ 578 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.52 \\ 578 \end{gathered}$ | 0.08 578 |

## Distribution of Doctor Fixed Effects: Delta Share



## Distribution of Doctor Fixed Effects: Invasive Services



## Concordance Table

|  | Quality |  |  | Communication |  |  | Access |  |  | Communication vs. Quality |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Which MD most qualified? |  |  | Which MD understands me? |  |  | Which MD available near me? |  |  |  |
|  | Black MD | White MD | Race Match | Black MD | White MD | Race Match | Black MD | White MD | Race Match | Race Match |
| Black Respondent | $\begin{gathered} 0.350^{* * *} \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.055^{*} \\ & (0.030) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.531^{* * *} \\ (0.024) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.001 \\ & (0.029) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.241^{* * *} \\ (0.024) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.255^{* * *} \\ (0.029) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.047 \\ (0.030) \end{gathered}$ |
| White Respondent |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.273^{* * *} \\ (0.029) \end{gathered}$ |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.479 * * * \\ (0.027) \end{gathered}$ |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.175^{* * *} \\ (0.030) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |
| Communication |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.144^{* * *} \\ (0.023) \end{gathered}$ |
| Mean | 0.11 | 0.27 | 0.54 | 0.12 | 0.19 | 0.69 | 0.11 | 0.43 | 0.62 | 0.48 |
| R-squared | 0.12 | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.23 | 0.24 | 0.04 | 0.09 | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.06 |
| Observations | 1,490 | 1,490 | 1,490 | 1,490 | 1,490 | 1,490 | 1,490 | 1,490 | 1,490 | 2,980 |

Communication

## Utilization and Concordance in MEPS

## Adult Male Sample

|  | Go To Doctor for <br> Preventive Care | Doctor Listens | Understand Doctor |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Black Respondent | $-0.008^{*}$ | -0.013 | -0.015 |
|  | $(0.005)$ | $(0.012)$ | $(0.014)$ |
| Hispanic Respondent | -0.002 | -0.010 | -0.012 |
| Asian Respondent | $(0.005)$ | $(0.013)$ | $(0.016)$ |
|  | -0.004 | -0.020 | -0.035 |
| Black MD | $(0.007)$ | $(0.019)$ | $(0.024)$ |
|  | -0.012 | $-0.064^{* *}$ | $-0.066^{*}$ |
|  | $(0.009)$ | $(0.025)$ | $(0.040)$ |
| Black Resp * Black MD | $0.020^{* *}$ | $0.082^{* * *}$ | $0.080^{*}$ |
|  | $(0.009)$ | $(0.026)$ | $(0.041)$ |
| Hispanic MD | -0.001 | $-0.028^{*}$ | 0.004 |
|  | $(0.005)$ | $(0.016)$ | $(0.017)$ |
| Hisp Resp * Hisp MD | 0.001 | $0.032^{*}$ | -0.004 |
|  | $(0.006)$ | $(0.018)$ | $(0.025)$ |
| Asian MD | -0.004 | -0.015 | 0.002 |
|  | $(0.005)$ | $(0.011)$ | $(0.014)$ |
| Asian Resp *Asian MD | 0.003 | -0.007 | -0.002 |
|  | $(0.008)$ | $(0.021)$ | $(0.028)$ |
| White Resp * White MD | -0.003 | -0.004 | 0.004 |
|  | $(0.005)$ | $(0.013)$ | $(0.016)$ |
| Any Insurance | 0.004 | $0.051^{* * *}$ | 0.022 |
|  | $(0.003)$ | $(0.010)$ | $(0.013)$ |
| Age Categories | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Income Categories | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Education Categories | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 32,661 | 22,473 | 7,837 |
| Years | $2005-2015$ | $2005-2015$ | $2011-2015$ |

## Proxy for Effort: Time Spent with Patient

- What does time spent represent?


## Proxy for Effort: Time Spent with Patient

- What does time spent represent?
- More tests ( Rx effect)?


## Proxy for Effort: Time Spent with Patient

- What does time spent represent?
- More tests ( Rx effect)?
- Efficiency (or lack thereof)?


## Proxy for Effort: Time Spent with Patient

- What does time spent represent?
- More tests ( Rx effect)?
- Efficiency (or lack thereof)?
- Communication?


## Effort: No Evidence of Targeting by Black Doctors

|  | Pre | Post | Delta | Pre | Post | Delta |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $X=$ | Increased Risk, High Cholesterol |  |  | Increased Risk, Diabetes |  |  |
| Black Doctor * X | $\begin{gathered} 0.039 \\ \{0.088\} \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.024 \\ \{0.090\} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.016 \\ & \{0.075\} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.160 \\ \{0.184\} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.154 \\ & \{0.192\} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.006 \\ \{0.140\} \end{gathered}$ |
| X | $\begin{gathered} 0.018 \\ \{0.062\} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.047 \\ \{0.062\} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.030 \\ \{0.048\} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.031 \\ \{0.129\} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.015 \\ \{0.129\} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.046 \\ \{0.095\} \end{gathered}$ |
| Black Doctor | $\begin{gathered} -0.022 \\ \{0.076\} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.234 \\ \{0.108\} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.256 \\ \{0.097\} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.058 \\ \{0.059\} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.202 \\ \{0.065\} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.144 \\ \{0.061\} \end{gathered}$ |
| $\operatorname{Prob}\left(\left\|\beta^{\text {RI: Black Dr }{ }^{*} X}\right\|>\mid \beta^{\text {Study Es. }}\right.$ Observations | $\begin{gathered} 0.733 \\ 620 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.825 \\ 620 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.877 \\ 620 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.450 \\ 561 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.606 \\ 561 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.946 \\ 561 \end{gathered}$ |

Standard errors clustered at the doctor level in curly brackets.

## Discrimination: No Evidence of Differing Thresholds

|  | Pre | Post | Delta | Pre | Post | Delta |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $X=$ | Increased Risk, High Cholesterol |  |  | Increased Risk, Diabetes |  |  |
| Black Doctor * $X$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.039 \\ \{0.088\} \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.024 \\ \{0.090\} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline-0.016 \\ & \{0.075\} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline-0.160 \\ \{0.184\} \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline-0.154 \\ & \{0.192\} \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.006 \\ \{0.140\} \end{gathered}$ |
| X | $\begin{gathered} 0.018 \\ \{0.062\} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.047 \\ \{0.062\} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.030 \\ \{0.048\} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.031 \\ \{0.129\} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.015 \\ \{0.129\} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.046 \\ \{0.095\} \end{gathered}$ |
| Black Doctor | $\begin{aligned} & -0.022 \\ & \{0.076\} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.234 \\ \{0.108\} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.256 \\ \{0.097\} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.058 \\ \{0.059\} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.202 \\ \{0.065\} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.144 \\ \{0.061\} \end{gathered}$ |
| $\operatorname{Prob}\left(\left\|\beta^{\text {RI: BlackDr*X}}\right\|>\mid \beta^{\text {Study Es. }}\right.$ Observations | $\begin{gathered} 0.733 \\ 620 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.825 \\ 620 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.877 \\ 620 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.450 \\ 561 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.606 \\ 561 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.946 \\ 561 \end{gathered}$ |

- 'Outcome' test - if threshold to screen higher, then non-black doctors would be predicted to pick up more disease (see Chandra and Staiger 2017).
- No differences in means nor are there differences in distributions.
- Consistent with study doctors following instructions as well as importance of patient autonomy in decisions about preventive healthcare.


## Subject Discrimination? : Pre-Consultation Results

|  | Blood <br> Pressure | BMI | Diabetes | Cholesterol | Flu <br> Vaccination |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Black Doctor | 0.025 | 0.023 | 0.050 | 0.010 | -0.009 |
|  | $(0.039)$ | $(0.040)$ | $(0.039)$ | $(0.038)$ | $(0.037)$ |
|  | $\{0.045\}$ | $\{0.043\}$ | $\{0.048\}$ | $\{0.052\}$ | $\{0.039\}$ |
| RI p-value | 0.635 | 0.645 | 0.431 | 0.875 | 0.850 |
| Control Mean | 0.56 | 0.50 | 0.37 | 0.35 | 0.20 |
| Observations | 637 | 637 | 637 | 637 | 637 |

## Results from Clinic Encounter: BMI



## Results from Clinic Encounter: Blood Pressure



## Results from Clinic Encounter: Cholesterol



## Results from Clinic Encounter: Diabetes



## Sample and Population Characteristics

|  | U.S., 2016 | Study <br> Sample |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Age | 43.21 | 43.04 |
| SHigh School Education | 0.58 | 0.63 |
| Uninsured | 0.17 | 0.28 |
| Unemployed | 0.07 | 0.31 |

Source: U.S. averages are from 2016 ACS

## Disease Prevalence



## Back-of-the-Envelope Health Valuation

- Change prob. of flu vaccine take-up by same amount if give patient $\approx \$ 5$ or a black doctor.
- This valuation calculation neglects effect on other services.
- In setting of misperceptions, demand curve questionable for welfare calculations.
- Use studies that estimate the value of preventive services to estimate health gain associated with intervention. (Kahn et al. 2010, Dehmer et al. 2017).
- Calculations suggest intervention could lead to a 19\% reduction in the black-white gap in male mortality rates for cardiovascular disease.
- Does not take into account diseases not included in the study (e.g. screening for HIV, prostate cancer).


## Issues with Back-of-the Envelope Approach

- Based off studies that assume those who screen positive obtain and follow guideline-recommended care.


## Issues with Back-of-the Envelope Approach

- Based off studies that assume those who screen positive obtain and follow guideline-recommended care.
- Assumes supply of black doctors to treat black patients.


## Non-Experimental Survey Respondents



## African-American Trends



Source: AAMC, Census Bureau Population Estimates

## Racial and Ethnic Differences in Medical School Representation



Source: AAMC, Census Bureau Population Estimates

## Physician Shortages in Minority Communities

- In California, Black/Hispanic communities 4x more likely to be designated physician shortage areas (PSA) regardless of community income.

Table 2. Association of Characteristics of Communities with the
Supply of Primary Care Physicians.*

| Characteristic | Urban Communties |  | Rural Communities |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | REGRESSION coefficient | 95\% CI | REGRESSION coefficient | 95\% CI |
| Household income $<\$ 15,000(\%)$ | 0.55 | -0.14 to 1.3 | -0.3 | -0.98 to 0.39 |
| Black race (\%) | -0.89 $\dagger$ | -1.4 to -0.40 | -1.35* | -2.7 to -0.05 |
| Hispanic (\%) | -0.9† | -1.2 to -0.56 | -0.57 $\dagger$ | -0.90 to -0.23 |
| Mean age (yr) | 1.57 | -1.4 to 4.6 | 0.09 | -2.8 to 3.0 |
| Male sex (\%) | -0.24 | -2.1 to 1.6 | -0.08 | -1.4 to 1.3 |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}=0.18$ |  |  | $\mathrm{R}^{2}=0.21$ |  |

[^0]
## Practice Location Choice

- African-American and Hispanic physicians more likely to practice in MUAs.


Source: Walker, Moreno, and Grumbach (2012)

## Occupational Choice

- African-American and Hispanic physicians more likely to work in primary care.



[^0]:    *The data are from the multivariate analysis. CI denotes confidence interval. $\dagger \mathrm{P} \leqslant 0.001$.
    $\ddagger \mathrm{P} \leqslant 0.005$.

